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THE FIGHT OVER COLUMBIA BASIN SALMON 
SPILLS AND THE FUTURE OF THE LOWER 
SNAKE RIVER DAMS 
Michael C. Blumm* 
Doug DeRoy** 
Abstract: 
One of the nation’s most longstanding environmental-energy conflicts 
concerns the plight of numerous Columbia Basin salmon species which must 
navigate the Federal Columbia River Power System (FCRPS), a series of 
hydroelectric dams that make the basin one of the most highly developed in the 
world. Although the FCRPS dams produce a wealth of hydropower, the 
mortalities they cause due to the construction and operation of FCRPS dams led 
to Endangered Species Act listings for the basin’s salmon.  Since those listings a 
quarter-century ago, the federal government has repeatedly failed to produce 
biological opinions that can survive judicial scrutiny. The latest round of 
litigation resulted in renewed directives from the federal district court of Oregon 
to revise the current biological opinion and to spill more water at several dams 
in the interim to facilitate juvenile salmon migration. The directive to increase 
spill was upheld by the Ninth Circuit in 2018, but the U.S. House of 
Representatives quickly voted to overturn that decision, and the Senate now has 
the matter under consideration. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This article considers the latest round of Columbia Basin 
salmon litigation and the threat of congressional intervention. 
We also examine the fate of four Snake River FCRPS dams 
that have proved particularly hazardous to listed salmon.  
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These dams provide no flood control, create electric power that 
is easily replaceable, and allow barge transportation for which 
there are ready substitutes. The article maintains that since 
these four dams can pass no reasonable cost-benefit test, 
Congress should not act to revise the court-ordered spills but 
instead order the lower Snake River dams removed.  Removing 
the lower Snake River dams would begin the restoration of the 
listed Snake River salmon and transform the economy of the 
Snake Basin in eastern Washington, Oregon, and Idaho. 
The Columbia Basin salmon saga continued in 2018 with the 
Ninth Circuit’s quick affirmance of Judge Michael Simon’s 
2017 decision to grant additional spill over federal dams to 
facilitate downstream salmon passage.1 This decision followed 
Judge Simon’s 2016 rejection of the latest federal biological 
opinion (BiOp) that attempted to demonstrate compliance with 
the Endangered Species Act (ESA) for numerous salmon 
species, listed largely due to construction and operation of 
federal dams.2 This rejection was only the latest in a long line 
of judicial rebuffs of similar efforts over the last two decades,3 
                                                 
*Jeffrey Bain Faculty Scholar & Professor of Law, Lewis and Clark Law School. 
**Wild Fish Advocate, Advocates for the West, Portland, Oregon. Doug graduated from 
Lewis and Clark Law School in 2016, with a J.D. and Certificate in Environmental & 
Natural Resources Law. In 2008, he earned a B.S. in Conservation & Resource 
Studies, with an emphasis in Energy Policy, from the University of California, 
Berkeley. 
We thank Lin Laughy for helpful comments on a draft of this article. 
1. See Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv. (NWF v. NMFS), 886 F.3d 
803 (9th Cir. 2018). 
2. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv. (NWFV), 184 F. Supp. 3d 861 
(D. Or. 2016). There are 13 ESA-listed species of salmonids affected by the operations 
of the FCRPS, id. at 879: (1) Snake River fall chinook salmon; (2) Snake River 
spring/summer chinook salmon; (3) Snake River steelhead; (4) Upper Columbia River 
spring chinook salmon; (5) Upper Columbia River steelhead; (6) Middle Columbia 
River steelhead; (7) Snake River sockeye salmon; (8) Columbia River chum salmon; (9) 
Lower Columbia River chinook salmon; (10) Lower Columbia River coho salmon; (11) 
Lower Columbia River steelhead; (12) Upper Willamette River Chinook salmon; and 
(13) Upper Willamette River steelhead. Id. Of these, 11 are listed as threatened and 
two—the Upper Columbia River spring chinook salmon and the Snake River sockeye 
salmon—are listed as endangered. Recent data shows that 65 percent of the 
populations in the listed evolutionary significant units (“ESUs”) are at “high risk” of 
extinction and 28.5 percent are at a “maintained” risk of extinction (the second-highest 
risk category), while only 4 percent are considered “viable” and just 2.5 percent are 
considered “highly viable”). Id. at 879–80. 
3. The recent decisions in this seemingly endless journey are described in a series of 
articles that include Michael C. Blumm, Erica J. Thorson & Joshua D. Smith, 
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although there were some new wrinkles in this decision, 
including a directive for federal implementing agencies to 
produce an adequate environmental impact statement to 
comply with the National Environmental Policy Act and, in 
2017, to increase spill at the dams pending completion of an 
adequate BiOp.4 
The Ninth Circuit’s affirmation of Judge Simon’s spill 
decision prompted a group of Northwest Republicans in 
Congress, led by Cathy McMorris-Rodgers (R-Wash.)—and 
joined by Democrat Kurt Schrader (D-Or.)—to draft a 
congressional override to the Simon decision that sailed 
through the U.S. House of Representatives in 2018.5 This ill-
advised measure would preserve hydropower that the 
Northwest no longer needs, as the Bonneville Power 
Administration (BPA) currently produces more power than it 
can market to its contracted customers.6 When this Article 
went to press in early 2019, the House bill faced an uncertain 
future in the Senate. 
The Senate’s reluctance to endorse the House bill may have 
                                                 
Practiced at the Art of Deception: The Failure of Columbia Basin Salmon Recovery 
Under the Endangered Species Act, 36 ENVTL. L. 709 (2006) [hereinafter Practicing 
Deception]; Michael C. Blumm & Hallison T. Putnam, Imposing Judicial Restraints on 
the “Art of Deception”: The Courts Cast a Skeptical Eye on Columbia Basin Salmon 
Restoration Efforts, 38 ENVTL. L. 47 (2008) [hereinafter Restraints on the Art of 
Deception]; Michael C. Blumm & Aurora Paulsen, The Role of the Judge in ESA 
Implementation: District Judge James Redden and the Columbia Basin Salmon Saga, 
32 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 87 (2013) [hereinafter The Judicial Role in ESA 
Implementation]; Michael C. Blumm, Juliane L. Fry & Olivier Jamin, Still Crying Out 
For a “Major Overhaul” After All These Years—Salmon and Another Failed Biological 
Opinion on Columbia Basin Hydroelectric Operations, 47 ENVTL. L. 287 (2016) 
[hereinafter Still Crying Out].  For an account of the earlier odyssey, see MICHAEL C. 
BLUMM, SACRIFICING THE SALMON: A LEGAL AND POLICY HISTORY OF THE DECLINE OF 
COLUMBIA BASIN SALMON, at 129–60 (2013) [hereinafter SACRIFICING THE SALMON]. 
4. See infra notes 32–34 and accompanying text. 
5. H.R. 3144, 115th Cong. (as passed by House, April 25, 2018). 
6. Anthony Jones et. al., The Bonneville Power Administration 2018: Threatened, 
Endangered, or on the Brink of Extinction?, ROCKY MOUNTAIN ECONOMETRICS, May 
2018, http://www.rmecon.com/examples/BonnevillePower%20May%202018.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/HD95-TD26] [hereinafter Brink of Extinction]; Anthony Jones et. al., 
Bonneville Power Administration and the Lower Snake River Dams: The Folly of 
Conventional Wisdom, ROCKY MOUNTAIN ECONOMETRICS, June 2018, 
http://www.rmecon.com/examples/BPA%20&%20LSRDs%206-5-18.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/PW4J-MVUU] (“Since 2011, hydropower alone from twenty-seven of 
BPA’s thirty-one dams—excluding the four LSRDs and all other sources of power—has 
produced more energy than the load demand of all of BPA’s preference customers”). 
3
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to do with several recent economic studies that showed that 
the Northwest is awash in electric power and that the cost of 
breaching the Lower Snake River (LSR) dams, which would 
obviate the need for the additional spill that Judge Simon 
ordered, would have no significant effects on the region’s 
economy.7 These studies show the brightest economic future of 
the Columbia Basin lies not with the continuation of the 
substantial federal subsidies necessary to maintain the LSR 
dams,8 but with the elimination of those subsidies and 
restoration of a free-flowing lower Snake River that could 
revitalize the central Idaho economy around the state’s 
exceptional salmon habitat.9 
This article pieces together these judicial, legislative, and 
administrative developments in an effort to assess the future 
of the LSR dams that were authorized without much express 
congressional deliberation toward the end of World War II,10 
and which have not delivered on any reasonable expectation of 
economic value.11  These dams, which cannot pass any sort of 
cost-benefit test, provide no flood control, marginal electric 
power that is uneconomic to the region, and highly subsidized 
barge transport of agricultural products for which there are 
ready and economical alternatives.  Like other uneconomical 
dams, it is time for these dams to go. Unlike those other 
dams—most of which have been removed by private 
utilities12—the LSR dams must be removed by the federal 
                                                 
7. See infra notes 94–104 and accompanying text. 
8. Costs of LSR dam operations include dredging to control sediment and avoid 
flooding as well as lock maintenance.  See infra note 92. 
9. A 2005 study on the potential economic impact of restored salmon and steelhead 
fishing in Idaho concluded that a restored salmon and steelhead fishery would bring 
almost $550 million every year to Idaho’s economy. DON C. READING, THE POTENTIAL 
ECONOMIC IMPACT OF RESTORED SALMON AND STEELHEAD FISHING IN IDAHO (2005), 
https://www.wildsalmon.org/images/PDFs/FishingEconReport.05.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/NC77-9UH5]. Communities in the Salmon River and Clearwater 
River basins, from Lewiston to Stanley, would be the biggest beneficiaries of restored 
salmon and steelhead fisheries—$331 million per year. Id. The LSR dams were never 
even expressly authorized by Congress.  See also Michael C. Blumm, Saving Idaho’s 
Salmon: A History of Failure and a Dubious Future, 28 IDAHO L. REV. 667, 672–73 
(1992). 
10. See SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra note 3, at 96–97. 
11. See infra notes 88–94, 117-118 and accompanying text. 
12. See Michael C. Blumm & Andrew B. Erickson, Dam Removal in the Pacific 
Northwest: Lessons for the Nation, 42 ENVTL. L. 1043, 1068–96 (2012) (discussing 
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government. But the ongoing costs of maintaining the LSR 
dams should make them prime candidates for removal, thereby 
eliminating the subsidies necessary to maintain them. The 
issues involved in LSR dam removal often involve complex 
scientific questions which have become a political battleground 
frequently filled with misleading or simplistic information, 
particularly about the relative abundance of the existing 
Columbia Basin salmon runs, so we discuss those issues as 
well. 
Section I of the article explains the Ninth Circuit’s 2018 
affirmation of Judge Simon’s spill decision of the prior year, 
and describes the events leading up to the 2018 decision. 
Section II discusses the U.S. House of Representatives passage 
of H.R. 3144 in 2018, which would overturn the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision with no real consideration of the economic effects of 
maintaining the LSR dams. Section III explores several recent 
studies by the Northwest Energy Coalition and others that 
reveal the Northwest has no economic need for power produced 
by the LSR dams and would gain economically by restoring the 
lower Snake to its free-flowing condition, particularly in 
central Idaho, blessed with the best remaining underused 
salmon habitat in the Columbia Basin. 
I.  THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S AFFIRMANCE OF JUDGE 
SIMON’S SPILL DECISION 
The Ninth Circuit’s affirmation of the district court’s 
decision was only the latest in a long series of decisions about 
how the federal Columbia River Supply System (FCRPS) 
dams13 should comply with the requirements of the federal 
ESA14 because that statute protects thirteen salmon species 
migrating up and down the Columbia River and its principal 
                                                 
removal of the Condit, Little Sandy, Marmot, Savage Rapids, Gold Hill, and Gold Ray 
dams, the breaching of the Elk Creek dam, and the proposed removal of four Klamath 
River dams. The Elwha and Glines Canyon dams, in or near Olympic National Park, 
were congressionally removed, see id. at 1049–58). 
13. The Federal Columbia River Power System (FCRPS) is an integrated system of 
14 dams in the Columbia Basin that produces hydropower that federal Bonneville 
Power Administration markets throughout the West. See BONNEVILLE POWER ADMIN. 
ET AL., THE COLUMBIA RIVER SYSTEM INSIDE STORY 19–20 (2d ed. 2001). 
14. Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA), 16 U.S.C. § 1531. 
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tributary, the Snake.15 
A.   The District Court’s Decision 
The salmon listings are now a quarter-century old.16 The 
federal government has required constant judicial oversight, 
including several injunctions, to comply with the ESA’s 
requirements for the listed salmon affected by FCRPS 
operations. The current round of ESA litigation over FCRPS 
operations began in 2000, a full eighteen years before the 
latest Ninth Circuit decision, when the National Marine 
Fisheries Service (NMFS) issued a BiOp that concluded that 
the hydroelectric operations would jeopardize listed salmon 
but that a reasonable alternative would avoid jeopardy.17 
Environmentalists and the state of Oregon, supported by a 
coalition of tribes as amici,18 challenged the adequacy of that 
BiOp, and the District Judge James Redden agreed with the 
plaintiffs, ordering the agency to issue a new BiOp.19 The 
revised BiOp, issued in 2004, surprisingly concluded there was 
no jeopardy associated with FCRPS operations.20  However, 
                                                 
15. See supra note 2.  On the ESA’s effect on salmon and vice-versa, see Michael C. 
Blumm & Greg D. Corbin, Salmon and the Endangered Species Act: Lessons from the 
Columbia Basin, 74 WASH. L. REV. 519, 591–602 (1999). 
16. Snake River Fall-run chinook, Snake River Spring/Summer-run chinook, and 
Snake River sockeye were each listed between 1991 and 1992. NOAA FISHERIES, 
STATUS OF ESA LISTINGS & CRITICAL HABITAT DESIGNATIONS FOR WEST COAST 
SALMON & STEELHEAD, 
http://www.westcoast.fisheries.noaa.gov/publications/gis_maps/maps/salmon_steelhead
/critical_habitat/wcr_salmonid_ch_esa_july2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZM5L-4SBC]. 
The other 10 listed species were listed between 1997 and 1999, except for Lower 
Columbia River coho, listed in 2005. Id. 
17. See Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv. (NWF v. NMFS), 886 
F.3d 803, 813 (9th Cir. 2018); see also Practicing Deception, supra note 3, at 749–60. 
18. The tribal coalition included the Nez Perce Tribe, the Confederated Tribes of the 
Umatilla Indian Reservation, the Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama 
Indian Nation, and the Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation of 
Oregon.  The state of Oregon’s participation in the litigation as a party (the tribes were 
only amici) should not be overlooked.  Without Oregon as a party, after the Columbia 
Basin Accords, discussed infra note 27, there would have been no sovereign as a 
plaintiff, which could have had a material effect on the litigation. 
19. See Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv. (NWF I), 254 F. Supp. 2d 
1196, 1211-12, 1215-16 (D. Or. 2003). 
20. NMFS employed novel definitions of “jeopardy” and “agency action” in a 
transparent effort to reduce its ESA obligations.  See Practicing Deception, supra note 
3, at 770-74; see also The Judicial Role in ESA Implementation, supra note 3, at 123–
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Judge Redden preliminarily enjoined implementation of that 
BiOp and ordered spills at FCRPS dams in order to facilitate 
juvenile salmon passage at the dams while NMFS prepared a 
revised BiOp.21 In 2005, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the 
district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the spill, 
although it remanded the case, asking the lower court to 
consider narrowing the scope of its injunction.22 The district 
court rejected the 2004 BiOp on the merits,23 and the Ninth 
Circuit affirmed in 2008.24 
That same year, 2008, NMFS issued another BiOp, this time 
acknowledging that FCRPS operations would in fact jeopardize 
listed salmon and adversely affect their critical habitat, but 
claimed that jeopardy could be avoided if the federal 
government pursued a reasonable alternative which included 
increased spill and numerous habitat restoration measures.25 
Two years later, the new Obama administration issued a 
supplemental BiOp, largely reiterating the prescriptions in the 
2008 version.26 That too was rejected by the district court, 
which ordered NMFS to issue a new BiOp by 2014.27 Although 
                                                 
29. 
21. See Practicing Deception, supra note 3, at 766–67, 795–96. 
22. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv. (NWF II), 422 F.3d 782 (9th 
Cir. 2005). 
23. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., No. CV 01–640–RE, CV 05–
23–RE, 2005 WL 2488447, at *3 (D. Or. Oct. 7, 2005) (“This remand, like the remand 
of the 2000 BiOp, requires NOAA and the Action Agencies to be aware of the 
possibility of breaching the four dams on the lower Snake River, if all else fails”) 
(emphasis in original); see Practicing Deception, supra note 3, at 774–94 (explaining 
the court’s reasoning); see also The Judicial Role in ESA Implementation, supra note 3, 
at 123–29. 
24. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv. (NWF III), 524 F.3d 917 (9th 
Cir. 2008); see also Restraints on the Art of Deception, supra note 3, at 50–57. 
25. See Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv. (NWF v. NMFS), 886 
F.3d 803, 814 (9th Cir. 2018) (explaining that the actions included modifications of 
dam operations, reductions in predation, habitat restoration, improved hatchery 
management, and research and monitoring). On spills and their importance to salmon 
migration, see Practicing Deception, supra note 3, at 729–33. 
26. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv. (NWF V), 184 F. Supp. 3d 
861, 881 (D. Or. 2016) (“[The 2010] BiOp incorporated the adaptive management 
implementation plan, which was developed in response to concerns expressed by Judge 
Redden in this case after reviewing the 2008 BiOp, and updated certain data, but 
otherwise retained the analysis from the 2008 BiOp”). 
27. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv. (NWF IV), 839 F. Supp. 2d 
1117, 1131 (D. Or. 2011); see The Judicial Role in ESA Implementation, supra note 3, 
at 138–42.  The Bonneville Power Administration, the federal agency marketing the 
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the litigation bought the government considerable time, the 
court required spill at FCRPS dams in the interim.28 
The next iteration of the BiOp occurred in 2014, again 
issued as a supplement to the 2008 version.29 NMFS once more 
concluded that FCRPS operations could avoid jeopardy and 
adverse critical habitat modification if NMFS and the 
implementing agencies pursued a reasonable alternative that 
included some 74 separate actions over a ten-year period.30 
Environmentalists and the state of Oregon challenged the 
BiOp once again, claiming that its implementing measures 
also violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).31 
When Judge Redden retired, Judge Michael Simon inherited 
the case. He also found NMFS’s Endangered Species Act (ESA) 
implementation wanting. In 2016, in an exhaustive 149-page 
opinion, Judge Simon determined that NFMS violated both the 
ESA and the Administrative Procedure Act, and that federal 
agencies operating the dams violated NEPA by failing to 
perform a comprehensive environmental impact statement 
(EIS) on the effect of FCRPS operations.32 The court ordered a 
new BiOp by 2018 and the EIS within five years or by 2021.33 
But in early 2017, the environmentalists and the state of 
Oregon sought interim injunctive relief to help remedy the 
                                                 
electricity produced by the FCRPS projects convinced the state of Washington and 
several tribes to drop the litigation in return for nearly $1 billion over 10 years, mostly 
for habitat restoration; however, the state of Oregon and the Nez Perce Tribe turned 
down the money and pursued the litigation.  See Still Crying Out, supra note 3, at 
290–91 nn.8–9 (discussing the so-called Columbia Basin Accords, cited infra note 60). 
28. See Nat’l Wildlife, 886 F.3d at 814. 
29. See id. 
30. See id. (explaining that the actions included modifications of dam operations, 
reductions in predation, habitat restoration, improved hatchery management, and 
research and monitoring). 
31. See Still Crying Out, supra note 3, at 318–23 (also discussing the judicial 
ratification of the lethal program to eradicate cormorants from the Columbia Basin 
estuary because of their predation on juvenile salmon). 
32. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv. (NWF V), 184 F. Supp. 3d 
861, 949-50 (D. Or. 2016), discussed in Still Crying Out, supra note 3, at 302–15, 318–
23 (explaining both the measures in the NMFS’ BiOp and Judge Simon’s reactions to 
them). However, the district court did not find that FCRPS operations adversely 
affected the listed salmon’s critical habitat and decided that they did not adversely 
affect Southern Resident Killer Whales in Puget Sound nor the Pacific Ocean.  See 
Nat’l Wildlife, 886 F.3d at 814–15; see also Still Crying Out, supra note 3, at 316–18. 
33. See Nat’l Wildlife, 886 F.3d at 815 (requiring a new BiOp due by Dec. 31, 2018, 
and a comprehensive EIS within five years or by 2021). 
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ESA violations identified in the court’s 2016 opinion during the 
two-year period during which the new BiOp was being 
prepared. The plaintiffs requested increasing spills to 
maximum level permitted by state law as well as disclosure of 
any federal capital expenditures that could prejudice the 
NEPA process.34 Oregon also asked for an order requiring the 
federal agencies to operate juvenile bypass facilities and 
monitoring systems at FCRPS dams.35 Judge Simon granted 
the injunctive relief but delayed implementation until 2018.36 
It was this injunction that the federal government appealed to 
the Ninth Circuit, not the adequacy of the BiOp. 
B.   The Ninth Circuit’s Decision 
With unusual speed, on April 2, 2018, a panel of the Ninth 
Circuit unanimously affirmed Judge Simon’s spill decision. 
The case had been argued only a couple of weeks earlier, yet 
the court published a detailed written opinion directing that 
the increased spill at FCRPS dams should begin almost 
immediately.37 Conservation, fishing, and clean-energy groups 
celebrated the decision as a necessary measure to begin 
making the FCRPS system compatible with rebuilding listed 
salmon populations.38 Power users and river navigators 
                                                 
34. See id. (explaining the proposal, which included exemptions for power 
emergencies and health and safety concerns). The states impose maximum spill limits 
by capping the amount of total dissolved gases (so-called “gas caps”) under their water 
quality standards.  High levels of dissolved gases injure juvenile salmon through gas 
bubble disease. 
35. See id. (discussing so-called passive integrative transponder (PIT) detection 
systems). 
36. See id. at 815–16 (calling for a spill plan with increased spills and PIT-tag 
monitoring beginning in 2018, and also requiring disclosure of some expenditures at 
FCRPS dams that could bias the results of the comprehensive EIS the court ordered). 
37. See Appeals Court Rules in Favor of More Spill for Juvenile Salmon, Steelhead at 
Columbia/Snake Dams, The Columbia Basin Bulletin (April 6, 2018), 
http://www.cbbulletin.com/440480.aspx [https://perma.cc/YC5S-FLNJ] (noting that 
oral argument occurred on March 20, 2018, and the court handed the decision down 
just thirteen days later, on April 2; also indicating that would begin immediately at 
lower Columbia River dams and on April 10 at lower Snake dams). 
38. See id. (quoting attorney Todd True: “After more than 20 years of federal failure, 
salmon are in desperate need of help now.  The measures the court upheld will give 
salmon a fighting chance while the federal government catches up to the scale and 
urgency of what the law requires to protect these fish from extinction;” Liz Hamilton, 
representing sport fishers, said the claim of lost power was a “false alarm,” since the 
Northwest power grid often has a surplus of power in the spring). 
9
Blumm and DeRoy: The Fight over Columbia River Basin Salmon Spills and the Future
Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2019
  
10 WASHINGTON J. OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY [Vol. 9:1 
 
complained about the efficacy of spill and its costs.39 
After dismissing the federal government’s procedural 
objections to the Simon decision and ruling that injunctive 
relief was permissible,40 the Ninth Circuit considered the 
government’s allegation that the injunction was overbroad. 
The government argued that the lower court’s finding of 
irreparable harm was erroneous and that the remedy, if in fact 
there was such harm, was not sufficiently tailored.41 
Determining the irreparable harm issue is the key to deciding 
ESA injunctions, as the statute restricts the equitable 
discretion of courts involving other injunctive relief factors.42 
The Ninth Circuit upheld Judge Simon’s determination that 
FCRPS operations irreparably damaged listed salmon, 
explaining that he was not required to find a short-term 
extinction-level threat due to a lack of increased spill during 
the years that the new BiOp was under preparation. All that 
was necessary was a determination of a definite threat of 
future harm.43 Thus, injunctive relief was proper even if there 
was no immediate extinction risk.44 Simon was also not 
required— contrary to the government’s allegation—to find 
harm based only on the lack of sufficient spill, rather than 
                                                 
39. BPA estimated the costs of additional spill at $40 million annually, see id., but 
that assumes that federal dams must be operated to maximize power product.  And in 
fact, the court-order spill was “rendered moot” by high spring river flows and 
accompanying involuntary spills caused by high temperatures melting snow unusually 
early and producing flooding.  See Court-Ordered Spring Spill Now Moot as High 
Columbia/Snake Flows Forcing Involuntary Spill at Dams, The Columbia Basin 
Bulletin (May 18, 2018), http://www.cbbulletin.com/440765.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/TD3W-LLM5]. 
40. The federal government alleged that the requested injunction was barred by 
Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), but the court decided that 
Judge Simon’s 2016 decision was not a final one, and thus Rule 60(b) did not apply. 
Nat’l Wildlife, 886 F.3d at 816–17. 
41. Id. at 817–20. 
42. See Cottonwood Envtl. L. Ctr. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 789 F.3d 1075, 1088, 1090 
(9th Cir. 2015) (ESA removes equitable judicial discretion concerning three factors of 
the four-factor injunctive relief question: presuming 1) the inadequacy of remedies at 
law, 2) that protecting listed species outweighs other interests, and 3) that the public 
interest would be served by the injunction), discussed in Nat’l Wildlife, 886 F.3d at 
817–18. See generally Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Statutory Violations and Equitable 
Discretion, 70 Cal. L. Rev. 524 (1982). 
43. Nat’l Wildlife, 886 F.3d at 819–20 (relying on Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Burlington 
N. R.R., 23 F.3d 1508, 1512 n.8 (9th Cir. 1994)). 
44. Nat’l Wildlife, 886 F.3d at 818–19. 
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FCRPS operations as a whole, as the appellate panel 
recognized that it would be difficult to “cleanly divorce” the 
adverse effects due to an inadequate spill regime from the 
adverse effects from FCRPS operations as a whole.45 And those 
aggregate operations, the court concluded, produced the 
majority of mortalities to the juvenile fish of listed species that 
remain in a “highly precarious status.”46 
The appeals court also rejected claims of a “mismatch” 
between Judge Simon’s conclusion that planned FCRPS 
operations would not adversely affect designated critical 
habitat and his decision on injunctive relief.47 The court also 
dismissed the charge that Simon’s decision ignored improved 
“risk trends” for the listed species.48  The panel emphasized 
that the district court “properly concluded” that the listed 
salmon species will remain in a precarious  state without 
additional conservation efforts beyond the years covered by the 
BiOp, and that “the migration corridors [of the Snake and 
Columbia Rivers] are degraded, are not functional, and do not 
serve their conservation role.”49 Thus, the fact that the 
government’s proposal would produce “significant 
improvements” in habitat “does not establish an absence of 
harm.”50 Moreover, the lower court’s reliance on the fact that 
climate change was likely to make the situation worse was, 
according to the panel, was not clearly erroneous.51 
Finally, the Ninth Circuit decided Judge Simon’s injunction 
was in fact “narrowly tailored” to avoid the irreparable harm 
identified by the district court, noting that Judge Simon 
evaluated expert testimony on both sides on the benefits of 
increased spill, and his conclusion favoring more spill was not 
                                                 
45. Id. at 819 (“Irreparable harm may be caused by activities broader than those 
that plaintiffs seek to enjoin.”). 
46. Id. at 820 (citing data showing that 50 of 77 populations of salmon are at a “high 
level” of extinction, including 27 of 28 Snake River spring/summer chinook populations 
and all of the spring/summer chinook populations in the Upper ‘sColumbia River). 
47. Id. at 821. Actually, there did seem to be such a mismatch. See Still Crying Out, 
supra note 3, at 316–18 (criticizing Judge Simon’s decision on critical habitat). 
48. Nat’l Wildlife, 886 F.3d at 821 (claiming that such trends were either stable or 
improving). 
49. Id. (quoting Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv. (NWF V), 184 F. 
Supp. 3d 861, 930 (D. Or. 2016)). 
50. Nat’l Wildlife, 886 F.3d at 821. 
51. Id. 
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clearly erroneous.52 The appeals court rejected the federal 
government’s argument that the injunction had to match up 
precisely with the irreparable harm, deciding that only “a 
sufficient causal connection” between a lack of increased spill 
and harm was necessary.53 The panel found the state of 
Oregon’s evidence that increased spill would increase survival 
and adult returns of salmon especially persuasive,54 further 
reflecting the important role the state has played in the 
litigation.55 The fact that some scientific uncertainty about the 
efficacy of spill remained was not dispositive because that 
uncertainty did not make Judge Simon’s injunction clearly 
erroneous.56 Actually, properly understood, the ESA resolves 
this sort of scientific uncertainty in favor of listed species.57 
The last point deserves some emphasis: scientific 
uncertainty is not a reason for an appellate court to reverse 
injunctive relief ordered by a district court. Also worth 
emphasizing is the fact that the Ninth Circuit found that the 
determination of irreparable harm—necessary for the spill 
injunction—need not be confined to a specific finding of the 
damages the listed species suffered as a result of insufficient 
spill at FCRPS projects, but instead extends to all the damage 
inflicted by FCRPS operations.58 The court’s affirmation that 
the migration corridor—the river with FCRPS operations—
was inadequate to avoid salmon jeopardy, especially given the 
effects of climate change,59 was also noteworthy. Finally, the 
steadfast role of the state of Oregon in the litigation no doubt 
was a major factor in the results of the litigation, particularly 
                                                 
52. Id. at 823–24. 
53. Id. at 823. 
54. Id. 
55. See Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv. (NWF I), 254 F. Supp. 2d 
1196 (D. Or. 2003); see also Nat’l Wildlife, 886 F.3d 803. 
56. Nat’l Wildlife, 886 F.3d at 823–24. The court also upheld Judge Simon’s 
injunction concerning requiring fish monitoring (so-called PIT-tag monitoring, see id. 
at 815) and an EIS requiring disclosure of certain FCRPS operations on grounds (to 
ensure that expenditures did not prejudice the result while the agencies prepared a 
new EIS on FCRPS operations) that the lack of monitoring was, like spill, part of a 
program causing irreparable harm, and the latter was not an appealable order. Id. at 
824. 
57. See Plater, supra note 42. 
58. See Nat’l Wildlife, 886 F.3d at 818–20. 
59. Id. at 821–22. 
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given that the state of Washington and several tribes agreed to 
withdraw in return for habitat funding from BPA.60 Having 
two sovereigns—the state of Oregon and the Nez Perce tribe—
supporting the environmentalists was in all probability 
determinative in terms of the outcome. Both sovereigns 
refused the BPA money to withdraw from the suit,61 and their 
persistence benefitted the salmon and those who depend upon 
them. 
II.  THE CONGRESSIONAL EFFORT TO OVERTURN THE 
SPILL DECISION 
After the Ninth Circuit affirmed Judge Simon’s decision, 
opponents of the spill decision wasted little time in coalescing 
around a congressional bill to overturn it. They drafted H.R. 
3144, a bill that would 1) reinstate the judicially rejected 2014 
BiOp, 2) forbid any operational changes from that BiOp 
without congressional approval, 3) foreclose any studies of 
possible changes in dam operations, like increased spill which 
could improve salmon survival, and yet 4) greenlight capital 
improvements that might foreclose future options.62 The bill 
proved quite popular among the lesser informed, perhaps 
influenced by claims that it was a bipartisan measure63 that 
would save the federal government $40 million annually on a 
so-called “experiment” at a time when salmon survival rates at 
“these dams” average “nearly ninety-seven percent.”64 The bill 
easily passed the House in 2018 on a vote of 225-189.65 
Examining the debate over the bill provides an example of the 
                                                 
60. See 2008 Columbia Basin Fish Accords: Memorandum of Agreement Between the 
Three Treaty Tribes and FCRPS Action Agencies, 1, 10–12, 17, 19, B-1 (2008), 
https://perma.cc/VY97-637N; William McCall, BPA, Tribes Reach $900 Million Deal to 
Help Columbia River Salmon, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 7, 2008, https://perma.cc/HZY4-
4Z9L; see Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv. (NWF I), 254 F. Supp. 2d 
1196 (D. Or. 2003); see also Nat’l Wildlife, 886 F.3d at 814. 
61. See McCall, supra note 60. 
62. 115 Cong. Rec. 3543 (Apr. 25, 2018) (reprinting H.R. 3144). 
63. The bill’s co-sponsors included a sole Democrat (Cong. Kurt Schrader, D-Or) but 
was opposed by both the Democratic Oregon and Washington governors.  See 115 
Cong. Rec. 3546–47 (Apr. 25, 2018). 
64. 115 Cong. Rec. 3543–44 (Apr. 25, 2018) (statement of Mrs. McMorris-Rodgers (R-
Wash.), the chief sponsor of H.R. 3144). 
65. See 115 Cong. Rec. 3560 (Apr. 25, 2018) (recording the vote). 
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role that misinformation can play in the making of public 
policy. 
Supporters of the bill not only cited the high costs of spill, 
which they termed as a salmon “experiment,” they portrayed 
the Columbia Basin salmon problem as one largely solved, 
claiming that nearly 600,000 fall chinook salmon would return 
in 2018, allegedly “many times higher than when they were 
first listed under the [ESA].”66 This claim ignored the fact that 
the ESA-listed fall chinook is only the naturally spawning 
population, while the 600,000 claim aggregated returns to both 
the Columbia and Snake Rivers,67 and was an estimate of 
mostly hatchery fish. Hatchery fish are not equivalent to wild 
fish and are not protected by the ESA.68 Claims that the 
Columbia Basin has entered an era of salmon abundance are 
wholly based on hatchery fish.69 
                                                 
66. 115 Cong. Rec. 3543 (Apr. 25, 2018) (statement of Mrs. McMorris-Rodgers, supra 
note 64). 
67. Aggregating returns of salmon throughout the basin is misleading because it 
masks weak runs that are the focus of the ESA listings. 
68. See, e.g., Restraints on the Art of Deception, supra note 3, at 69–82. 
69. George Plaven, Columbia Basin Breaking Records for Returning Fall Chinook 
Salmon, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 29, 2015, https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-
news/columbia-basin-breaking-records-for-returning-fall-chinook-salmon/ 
[https://perma.cc/DZ8Q-MATX] (“The Columbia Basin’s 2015 salmon season is the 
second-strongest year since the federal dams were built nearly 80 years ago”); 
COURTLAND L. SMITH, SALMON ABUNDANCE AND DIVERSITY IN OREGON: ARE WE 
MAKING PROGRESS?, OR. SEA GRANT (2014), 
https://oregonstate.edu/instruct/anth/smith/SalmonAbundanceandDiversity_s14002.pd
f [https://perma.cc/6MDV-U3D3], (“[In] 2013, an estimated 80 percent of the returning 
Columbia Basin adult salmon were born in hatcheries.”). Property rights opponents of 
wild salmon restoration once convinced a federal judge that the federal effort to protect 
only naturally spawning fish was inconsistent with the ESA, but that decision did not 
survive ensuing decisions. See Restraints on the Art of Deception, supra note 3, at 69–
70, 74–80. 
  Belying claims of salmon abundance is the tragic condition of Southern Resident 
Killer Whales (Orcas), which are in danger of extinction due to a lack of food sources, 
principally chinook salmon from the Columbia River. Orcas, which feed near the 
mouth of the Columbia River in winter along their annual migration from southeast 
Alaska to Monterrey, California, do not distinguish between wild and hatchery 
salmon.  But low salmon abundance in recent years has resulted in low reproductive 
success, and the population is now down to fewer than 80 individual whales.  Many 
scientists have concluded that best chance for recovery lies in removal of the LSR 
dams and a restoration of more natural migration conditions in the Snake River, 
historically the largest supplier of salmon in the Columbia Basin.  See Rocky Barker & 
Brittany Peterson, Fate of Pacific Northwest Orcas Tied to Having Enough Columbia 
River Salmon, IDAHO STATESMAN (July 9, 2017), 
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https://www.idahostatesman.com/news/local/environment/article160452294.html 
[https://perma.cc/HM4Q-SEPU]; see Steve Mashuda, Tragic Orca Deaths Underscore 
Urgent Need to Restore Salmon Runs, EARTHJUSTICE (June 18, 2018), 
https://earthjustice.org/blog/2016-november/tragic-orca-deaths-underscore-urgent-
need-to-restore-salmon-runs [https://perma.cc/2DLP-CMQQ]; see Monika Wieland, 
Orcas and Salmon: Making the Connection, WILD ORCA (July 25, 2018), 
http://www.wildorca.org/orcas-salmon/ [https://perma.cc/H6CF-YXXN].  NMFS has 
acknowledged that increasing salmon abundance would be an important component of 
the species’ recovery but has claimed that since the orcas prey on many different 
salmon stocks at different times during their life cycle, no one salmon recovery 
action—like LSR removal—would recovery orcas by itself. Southern Resident Killer 
Whales and Snake River Dams, NOAA Fisheries Serv. (2016), 
http://www.westcoast.fisheries.noaa.gov/publications/protected_species/marine_mamm
als/killer_whales/killerwhales_snakeriverdams.pdf [https://perma.cc/L2Y4-V6FP]. 
  A particularly heartbreaking story was the July 2018 account of a listed Southern 
Resident Orca who gave birth to a calf only to have it die within a half-hour.  The 
mother proceeded to carry the body for at least 17 days and over 1000 miles in 
apparent grief over the loss.  See Lynda V. Mapes, After 17 Days and 1,000 Miles, 
Mother Orca Tahlequah Drops Dead Calf, Frolics with Pod, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 13, 
2018, 
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/environment/after-17-days-and-1000-miles-
mother-orca-tahlequah-drops-her-dead-calf/ [https://perma.cc/5KV4-HZRM]. This was 
not an isolated incident, as seven species of whales and dolphins in three oceans have 
been documented carrying deceased young. Although any loss of the endangered 
Orcas, given their dwindling numbers, is tragic, the real story behind the plight of the 
Southern Residents is that of 11 young whales born to one family in 2014, five have 
died within four years, and another appears close to starving. See Lynda V. Mapes, 
Orca Mother Carries Dead Calf for Sixth Day as Family Stays Close By, SEATTLE 
TIMES, July 29, 2018, https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/environment/orca-
mother-carries-dead-calf-for-fifth-day-her-entire-family-is-also-staying-close-by/ 
[https://perma.cc/E5GX-VHJZ] (noting that the Orcas face at least three considerable 
challenges: 1) vessel noise, which interrupts their foraging; 2) toxins, which are 
released into their bloodstream and calves’ milk, especially when the whales are 
hungry; and 3) lack of food, especially chinook salmon); see also Jamie Hale, Heartache 
in the San Juan Islands: Locals Grieve as Resident Orcas Face Extinction, OREGONIAN, 
Sept. 14, 2018, https://www.oregonlive.com/expo/life-and-culture/erry-
2018/09/86bb6304791189/heartache-in-the-san-juan-isla.html [https://perma.cc/4HLK-
9N5B] (vivid portrayal of the edge of extinction for the Southern Residents and the 
effect of their plight on local populations). 
  On November 16, 2018, Washington Governor Jay Inslee’s Southern Resident 
Killer Whale Recovery Task Force made some 36 recommendations to begin to recover 
the depleted Orcas, including increasing runs of Columbia River chinook salmon to 
feed the whales by increasing spills at federal dams to promote fish passage and 
establishing a “stakeholder process” to consider removing the four LSR 
dams.  Southern Resident Orca Task Force, Report and Recommendations (Nov. 16, 
2018), https://www.governor.wa.gov/sites/default/files/OrcaTaskForce_reportandrecom
mendations_11.16.18.pdf?utm_medium=email&utm_source=gov.  Also, on December 
18, 2018, the Center for Biological Diversity and Wild Fish Conservancy notified the 
Trump administration they would file suit charging that the government’s 
mismanagement of West Coast salmon fisheries violated the Endangered Species Act 
by harming the listed Southern Residents.  Center for Biological Diversity, Press 
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The opponents of the spill decision also claimed that they 
were supporting a scientific salmon plan that the unelected 
federal judge upended via “judicial overreach”70 and 
maintained that “Federal fisheries scientists believe that 
[judicial prescribed] spill measures will provide little or no 
benefits to juvenile salmon or returning adult salmon.”71 The 
opponents characterized Judge Simon’s decision as a 
consequence of “abusive litigation” and claimed that 
overturning the judge’s decision was necessary “for the sake of 
salmon runs.”72 The sole regional Democrat supporting the bill, 
Kurt Schrader (D-Or.) alleged that fully one-third of “our 
power bills in the Northwest is devoted to fish recovery,” while 
“sea lions will likely account for 20 percent or more of adult 
salmon loss in the Columbia Basin system.”73 
Opposition to H.R. 3144 was widespread. Some 140 
businesses and business associations representing commercial 
and recreational salmon fishermen and related businesses 
opposed the bill.74 In addition to the states of Oregon and 
                                                 
Release (Dec. 18, 
2018), https://www.biologicaldiversity.org/news/press_releases/2018/southern-resident-
killer-whale-12-18-2018.php [https://perma.cc/2NDE-ADN2]. 
  The viability of the Southern Resident population was a prominent factor in a 
recent decision by Canada’s Federal Court of Appeal overturning approval of an 
expansion of the TransMountain pipeline transporting Albertan tar sands to the 
British Columbia coast. The court found that an environmental report on the 
expansion that concluded that it would have no significant effects on the marine 
environment, particularly the Southern Residents, was unreasonable. Tsleil-Waututh 
Nation v. Attorney General of Canada, [2018] F.C.R. 153 (Can.), 
https://decisions.fcacaf.gc.ca/fca-
caf/decisions/en/item/343511/index.do?r=AAAAAQAIU3F1YW1pc2gB (also 
invalidating the expansion due to inadequate consultation with First Nations). 
70. See Providing for the Operations of the Federal Columbia River Power System, 
164 Cong. Rec. H3542-01, H3544 (Apr. 25, 2018) (statement of Mrs. McMorris-
Rodgers). 
71. Id. (statement of Ms. Herrida Beutler (R-Wash.)). 
72. Id. 
73. Id. at H3546 (Apr. 25, 2018) (statement of Cong. Schrader, who also claimed that 
the “entire Northwest delegation, Republican and Democrat, worked together on this” 
without explaining why he was the only Democratic member of the Northwest 
delegation to support the bill, and without explaining the opposition of the governors 
of Oregon and Washington, see supra note 63). 
74. 164 Cong. Rec. 3547–48 (Apr. 25, 2018). Many more opponents signed on to a 
related statement that claimed “H.R. 3144 is based on misinformation, fails to 
recognize the important role wild salmon . . . play for Northwest communities and 
ecosystems, and would severely undermine ongoing and much-needed protection 
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Washington,75 the Nez Perce Tribe also vigorously opposed the 
bill.76 None of this opposition was reflected in the statements of 
                                                 
efforts.”  Id. at H3548 (statement of Tom France, Pacific Regional Executive Director, 
National Wildlife Federation. Missoula, Montana; Giulia Good Stefani, Staff Attorney 
for the Marine Mammal Protection Project, National Resources Defense Council, 
Mosier, Oregon; Robb Krehbiel, Washington State Representative, Defenders of 
Wildlife, Seattle, Washington; Wendy Gerlitz, Policy Director, NW Energy Coalition, 
Portland, Oregon; Ben Enticknap, Pacific Campaign Manager & Senior Scientist, 
Oceana, Port- land, Oregon; Bill Arthur, Columbia-Snake River Salmon Caucus Chair, 
Sierra Club, Seattle, Washington; Julian Matthews, Enrolled Nez Perce Tribal 
member and Treasurer, Nimipuu Protecting the Environment, Pullman, Washington; 
Liz Hamilton, Executive Director, Northwest Sportfishing Industry Association, 
Oregon City, Oregon; Jeremy Brown, President Coastal Trollers Association, 
Bellingham, Washington; Thomas O’Keefe, Ph.D, Pacific Northwest Stewardship 
Director, American Whitewater, Seattle, Washington; Wendy McDermott, Rivers of 
Puget Sound-Columbia Basin Director, American Rivers, Bellingham, Washington; 
Noah Oppenheim, Executive Director, Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen’s 
Associations, San Francisco, California. Howard Garrett and Susan Berta, Directors, 
Orca Network, Whidbey Island, Washington State; Aaron Tam, Pacific Northwest 
Organizer, Endangered Species Coalition, Washington, D.C; Joseph Bogaard, 
executive director, Save Our wild Salmon Coalition, Seattle, Washington; Kevin Lewis, 
Executive Director, Idaho Rivers United, Boise, Idaho; Justin Hayes, Program 
Director, Idaho Conservation League, Boise, Idaho; Rich Simms, President, Wild 
Steelhead Coalition, Seattle, Washington; Greg Haller, Conservation Director, Pacific 
Rivers, Portland, Oregon; Mike Petersen, Executive Director, The Lands Council, 
Spokane, Washington; Tom VanderPlaat, President, Association of Northwest 
Steelheaders, Milwaukie, Oregon, John DeVoe, Executive Director, WaterWatch of 
Oregon, Portland Oregon; Ed Chaney, Director, Northwest Resource Information 
Center, Eagle, Idaho; Brian Brooks, Executive Director, Idaho Wildlife Federation, 
Boise, Idaho. Colleen Weiler, Rekos Fellow for Orca Conservation, Whale and Dolphin 
Conservation, Corvallis, Oregon; Trish Rolfe, Executive Di- rector, Center for 
Environmental Law & Pol- icy, Seattle, Washington; Brett VandenHeuvel, Executive 
Director, Colum- bia Riverkeeper, Hood River, Oregon; Grant Putnam, President, 
Northwest Guides and Anglers Association, Clackamas, Oregon; Andrea Matzke, 
Executive Director, Wild Washington Rivers, Index, Washington; Miyoko Sakashita, 
Oceans Director, Senior Counsel, Center for Biological Diversity, Oakland, California; 
Bert Bowler, Director, Snake River Salmon Solutions, Boise, Idaho; Gary MacFarlane, 
Ecosystem Defense Director, Friends of the Clearwater, Moscow, Idaho; Bob Sallinger, 
Conservation Director, Audubon Society of Portland, Portland, Oregon; Michael Wells, 
President, Clearwater-Snake Rivers Trout Unlimited, Moscow, Idaho; Darilyn Parry 
Brown, Greater Hells Canyon Council, La Grande, Oregon; Chris Wilke, Ex- ecutive 
Director, Puget Soundkeeper Alliiance, Seattle, WA; Whitney Neugebauer, Director, 
Whale Scout, Bothell, Washington.) 
75. See supra note 63. 
76. 164 Cong. Rec. 3548 (Apr. 25, 2018). The other treaty tribes with off-reservation 
treaty rights to salmon on the Columbia River—the tribes of the Umatilla, Yakama, 
and Warm Springs reservations—could not object due to the Columbia River Accords, 
supra note 60, because they reached agreements under which BPA paid for mostly 
habitat restoration efforts in return for their support for the 2008 BiOp for 10 years. 
See Still Crying Out, supra note 3, at 290–91 nn. 8–10, 302. 
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those supporting the bill. 
The partisan nature of the passage of H.R. 3144 is an 
ominous development for efforts to restore Snake River salmon 
runs. Despite the rosy assurances of the supporters of H.R. 
3144, the Snake River runs are in dire straits. The ninety-
seven percent survival figure cited above,77 for example, 
ignores the fact that in 2016 only twelve percent of wild 
juvenile sockeye salmon (the most imperiled of the listed 
species) survived the federal dams, and that further losses 
occur below the dams in the lower river from delayed mortality 
due to the adverse cumulative effects of dam passage and from 
avian predation.78 Survival rates are not improving either—
NMFS has reported no significant improvement over the past 
two decades, despite large-scale expenditures on so-called fish 
passage improvements.79 
Snake River salmon runs once produced half of the adult 
returns in the Columbia Basin, but in 2015 accounted for just 
fifteen percent of chinook passing Bonneville Dam; Snake 
River coho only 3.5 percent; and Snake River sockeye just 0.2 
percent.80 Yet Congresswoman McMorris-Rodgers, the chief 
sponsor of H.R. 3144, claimed that adult returns in 2018 would 
be “many times higher” than when listed under the ESA, 
falsely suggesting that listed salmon have recovered, 
apparently equating hatchery returns with wild stock 
returns.81 
The best measure of recovery of the listed species are smolt-
                                                 
77. See supra text accompanying note 65.  The 97% figure lumps salmon passage at 
all Columbia Basin dams; it does not reflect juvenile salmon survival at the LSR dams. 
78. Letter from Linwood Laughy to Washington and Oregon’s House of 
Representatives, Letter: A Boondoggle of a Bill (LSRD facts) (July 12, 2017), 
https://srkwcsi.org/2017/07/14/letter-a-boondoggle-of-a-bill-lsrd-facts/ 
[https://perma.cc/T8V3-Z9WH]. The survival rate in 2015 for Snake River sockeye was 
32%. Id. Delayed mortality is mortality salmon smolts suffer in the lower river below 
the dams, presumably due the cumulative stress they suffered passing the upriver 
dams. See John W. Ferguson et al., Evidence of Delayed Mortality on Juvenile Pacific 
Salmon Passing Through Turbines at Columbia River Dams, 135  Transactions Am. 
Fisheries Soc’y 139 (2005), 
https://afspubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1577/T05-080.1 
[https://perma.cc/HWM4-KKMW]. 
79. Laughy, supra note 78 (reporting expenditures of $700 million at the LSR dams). 
80. Laughy, supra note 78 (reporting similar figures for 2014: 14% of chinook at 
Bonneville Dam were Snake River origin; 6% of coho; and .5% of sockeye). 
81. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
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to-adult return (SAR) ratios.82 A ratio of one percent is 
necessary for survival and two to six percent is necessary for 
recovery.  Between 1993 and 2013 the SAR for Snake River 
wild chinook was just .89 percent.83  No listed Snake River 
salmon or steelhead species is on the road to recovery.84 
Passage of H.R. 3144 was met with chagrin by salmon 
advocates. Idaho Rivers United protested that the bill reflected 
a failure to recognize and protect Idaho’s salmon legacy, 
labeling it “The Salmon Extinction Act.”85 A board member of 
Wild Steelhead Coalition decried the bill as an effort to lock in 
a plan of proven failure while preventing even the study of 
effective recovery plans.86 
H.R. 3144 is now before the U.S. Senate. Senator Patty 
Murray has voiced opposition to the bill more than once,87 and 
its future remains quite uncertain as this Article goes to press 
in 2019. That uncertainty, however, should not deflect 
attention from an assessment of the real costs and benefits of 
maintaining the LSR dams. 
                                                 
82. See NOAA Fisheries, Adult Upstream Survival, 
https://www.westcoast.fisheries.noaa.gov/fish_passage/fcrps_opinion/adult_upstream_s
urvival.html [https://perma.cc/9GHF-K2WQ]. SAR measures the ratio of juvenile fish 
traveling out to the ocean to the number of adults counted at the last dam they passed 
before spawning. Id. 
83. Laughy, supra note 78. 
84. See id. 
85. U.S. House Passes HR 3144, IDAHO RIVERS UNITED (Apr. 25, 2018), 
https://www.idahorivers.org/newsroom/2018/4/24/us-house-passes-hr-3144 
[https://perma.cc/P6JK-R5LL] (quoting Executive Director Kevin Lewis: “Salmon need 
healthier rivers and safer passage past dams, not new barriers to survival and 
recovery. We’ll be looking to the Senate now for help stopping this bill that not only 
upsets the balance of power in our government, but puts an Idaho legacy unnecessarily 
at risk.”). 
86. Josh Mills, Bill Would Rubber-Stamp Salmon Failure, SPOKESMAN-REVIEW, Aug. 
12, 2017, http://www.spokesman.com/stories/2017/aug/12/josh-mills-bill-would-rubber-
stamp-salmon-failure/ [https://perma.cc/A8GY-TYZN] (noting that over the past 20 
years the value of the LSR dams has declined “dramatically, with river barging down 
70 percent and energy produced by the dams worth much less with the rise in 
renewables and efficiency.”). 
87. Letter from Senator Patty Murray to Speaker of the House Paul Ryan et al., 
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III.  THE ECONOMICS OF THE LOWER SNAKE RIVER 
DAMS 
Congress authorized the LSR dams in 1945 largely to 
provide work for returning servicemen in the post-war 
economy, despite the fact that the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers seven years earlier had reported that the benefits of 
creating a slack-water navigation channel between Lewiston, 
Idaho and the ocean were just fifteen cents for every federal 
dollar of cost.88 It took three decades for the Corps to complete 
the navigation channel, as the last of the four LSR dams—
none of which were ever specifically authorized by 
Congress89—became operational in 1975, roughly a decade-
and-a-half before the ESA listings for Snake River salmon.90 
The LSR dams never produced much hydropower—only 
about four percent of the Northwest’s electricity—half of which 
is generated during the high-runoff months in the spring when 
demand for power is at its lowest and electric prices are 
down.91 As run-of-the river dams, the LSR dams provide no 
flood control. In fact, Lower Granite Dam increases flood risk 
to Lewiston, Idaho as a result of the roughly two million cubic 
yards of sediment deposited behind the dam each year.92 
Regular dredging, paid for through federal subsidies, is 
required.93 
                                                 
88. See SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra note 3, at 96–97; see also Michael C. 
Blumm, Hydropower vs. Salmon: The Struggle of the Pacific Northwest’s Anadromous 
Fish Resources for a Peaceful Coexistence with the Federal Columbia River Power 
System, 11 ENVTL. L. 211, 230 (1981) (citing H.R. Doc. No. 75-704, 2d Sess. (1938)). 
89. The 1945 Rivers and Harbors Act simply authorized “such dams are necessary” 
as determined by the Army Corps of Engineers.  See SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra 
note 3, at 97. 
90. See, e.g., SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra note 3, at 175 (discussing the listings 
in 1991 and 1992). 
91. Anthony Jones & Linwood Laughy, Bonneville Power Administration and the 
Lower Snake River Dams: The Folly of Conventional Wisdom, ROCKY MOUNTAIN 
ECONOMETRICS, June 2018, 
http://www.rmecon.com/examples/BPA%20&%20LSRDs%206-5-18.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5BHR-RWRM]. The limited hydropower potential of the development 
of the Lower Snake was reflected in the Corps’ low cost-benefit ratio in 1938.  See 
SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra note 3, at 96–97 and accompanying text. 
92. The flood risk to Lewiston is well captured in STEVEN HAWLEY, RECOVERING A 
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The LSR dams did create a port in Lewiston, some 465 river 
miles from the Pacific Ocean, the farthest inland port on the 
West Coast. The navigation channel produced cheap transport, 
but barge transport—mostly of agriculture commodities 
(largely grain) through the reservoirs created by the dams—is 
down by half over the last twenty years.94 There are ready rail 
and truck alternatives to barging from Lewiston, so even if the 
LSR navigation channel were eliminated, barging would 
remain available on the Columbia River at Pasco, Washington, 
just 130 miles away. 
The affordability of breaching the LSR dams has been well 
known for some time.  In the late 1990s, a half-dozen studies, 
including one by the Northwest Power Planning Council, 
concluded that drawing the Lower Snake down to natural river 
flows was an affordable option.95 One study that included 
estimated economic benefits of natural river flows concluded 
that the region would save $87 million annually.96 Another 
found that the region’s net benefit from breaching would be 
$183 million.97 
Recent studies confirm these two-decade old predictions. A 
2018 Northwest Energy Coalition-funded study by Energy 
Strategies found that the power produced by the LSR dams 
was replaceable by a balanced portfolio of clean energy sources 
(solar, wind, energy-efficiency, demand-response, and storage) 
with no reliance on additional gas-fired generation.98 The 
                                                 
94. Laughy, supra note 78. 
95. See Michael C. Blumm et al., Saving Snake River Water and Salmon 
Simultaneously: The Biological, Economic, and Legal Case for Breaching the Lower 
Snake River Dams, Lowering John Day Reservoir, and Restoring Natural River Flows, 
28 ENVTL. L. 997, 1023–31 (1998) [hereinafter The Case for Breaching the LSR Dams] 
(summarizing six studies, including NORTHWEST POWER AND CONSERVATION COUNCIL, 
ANALYSIS OF THE BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION’S POTENTIAL FUTURE COSTS 
AND REVENUES (1998)). 
96. Id. 
97. Id. 
98. Northwest Energy Coalition, The Lower Snake River Dams Power Replacement 
Study: Fact Sheet (Apr. 4, 2018), https://nwenergy.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/04/LSRD-Study-Fact-Sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/43BF-ZY5U].  
The Northwest Energy Coalition is an alliance of about 100 environmental, civic, and 
human service organizations, progressive utilities, and businesses in Oregon, 
Washington, Idaho, Montana and British Columbia which promotes development of 
renewable energy and energy conservation, consumer protection, low-income energy 
assistance, and fish and wildlife restoration on the Columbia and Snake rivers.  
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study concluded that the cost of replacing the LSR dams with 
clean energy—with little or no increase in greenhouse gas 
emissions—was small in comparison to the cost of operating 
the regional power system, amounting to not much more than 
an additional dollar per month to the average residential bill.99 
The results clearly showed that the LSR dams can be removed 
and replaced with clean and renewable energy sources. But the 
study did not attempt to identify an optimal clean energy 
solution, instead predicting that “additional efficiencies and 
savings will likely be found if future costs for renewable energy 
sources and storage turn out to be lower than the 
comparatively conservative figures” that the report 
employed.100 
The Northwest Energy Coalition study assumed that 
replacement power was needed to compensate for the loss of 
power produced by the LSR dams. That assumption has been 
called into question by other studies showing that the 
Northwest is awash in power, and that the LSR hydropower is 
nearly completely surplus to the region’s needs. For example, 
between 2007 and 2018, BPA needed LSR power to meet its 
contractual obligations for only two hours, both in 2009.101  
Moreover, in recent years, wind, natural gas, and solar power 
have exceeded the LSR hydropower six times over.102 
Surplus power, including LSR dam-generated power, is often 
sold in the spring for little or nothing. In fact, a BPA 
                                                 
Energy Strategies is an independent consulting firm based in Salt Lake, Utah, whose 
clients include power producers, transmission developers, utilities, government 
agencies, non-profit organizations, and large energy users throughout North America.  
See Energy Strategies, OUR STORY, https://www.energystrat.com/ 
[https://perma.cc/B99W-L5P4] (last visited Nov. 25, 2018). 
99. Northwest Energy Coalition, supra note 98. 
100. Northwest Energy Coalition, The Lower Snake River Dams Power Replacement 
Study (Apr. 2018), https://nwenergy.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/LSRDS-study-4-
page-overview.pdf [https://perma.cc/9RM3-G3W2].  The study noted that a full study of 
dam removal would have to address the costs of decommissioning the dams but also 
factor in the cost savings from dam removal, including costs saved on dam 
maintenance and the economic benefits of healthy salmon populations in a restored 
river which a previous Northwest Energy Coalition student found would amount to a 
total net savings.  Id. 
101. Jones & Laughy, supra note 91, at 4 (noting that even during those hours 
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“oversupply management protocol” requires the agency to shut 
down other sources of power and reimburse those sources for 
lost revenues. Even after other sources are curtailed, BPA still 
has more power than it can market, so the agency often 
engages in negative pricing, even sometimes paying power 
wholesalers outside the Northwest to take surplus power off its 
hands—meaning that BPA’s preference customers often 
subsidize power shipped to California.103  According to a recent 
study, had the LSR dams been taken out in 2008, BPA could 
have met all its customers’ demands while saving “at least 
$100 million per year.”104 At a time when ninety-nine percent 
of Snake River sockeye perish before reaching their spawning 
grounds,105 and the estimated cost of rehabilitating twenty-two 
power turbines at the four LSR dams is over $1 billion, BPA 
would best serve both its customers and the Snake River 
salmon runs by supporting removal of the LSR dams. 
It is no secret that BPA faces a financial cliff.106 Its power 
sales have fallen due to conservation, increased efficiency, and 
the investments its customer have made in solar and wind 
power.107 Cheap natural gas and California’s ongoing 
commitments to renewable energy have also dampened 
demand. The BPA Administrator has admitted that the agency 
is in dire straits: “We’ve taken huge hits in the secondary 
revenues market just like every other hydro provider up here, 
with cheap gas, low load growth, and the oversupply 
                                                 
103. Id. at 3–4, 6.  BPA’s preference customers are publicly-owned utilities and 
electricity cooperatives in the Northwest who have priority access to BPA power, and 
are eligible to purchase power at a priority rate for most of their loads. 16 U.S.C. § 
832c. 
104. Jones & Laughy, supra note 91, at 6. 
105. See Laughy, supra note 78 (using 2015 figures). 
106. See, e.g., Eric Barker, BPA at a Crossroads, LEWISTON TRIBUNE, July 8, 2018, 
https://lmtribune.com/northwest/bpa-at-a-crossroads/article_75a029df-95bd-52c6-861e-
1fbfbe822739.html [https://perma.cc/CWR5-RWDX]; Carol Winkel, BPA Heading for a 
“Financial Cliff”, NORTHWEST POWER AND CONSERVATION COUNCIL (Feb. 15, 2018),  
https://www.nwcouncil.org/news/bpa-heading-financial-cliff [https://perma.cc/FMC9-




(“BPA face[s] a financial cliff in 2028 when its power rates may not be attractive 
enough for its long-term customers to renew 20-year contracts”). 
107. See Brink of Extinction, supra note 6, at 2. 
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conditions. It’s been a bloodbath for folks in the wholesale 
market. I’m not in panic mode, but I am in a very, very 
significant sense of urgency mode.”108 BPA’s response to these 
ominous economic conditions has been to dissipate its reserve 
account and increase rates by thirty percent over eight 
years.109 Going forward, BPA’s plan is to sell more surplus 
electricity, but it is hardly clear how more sales in a saturated 
market—with falling demand and prices—will solve the 
agency’s financial problems.110 
A promising solution would be to eliminate high cost/low 
value assets like the LSR dams because the dams produce 
surplus power for which there is little or no demand, 
particularly in the spring.111  Yet BPA has invoked the court-
ordered EIS on the operation of the system, not due until 2021, 
as a reason not to take action until then, perhaps hoping that 
Congress will enact H.R. 3144,112 thereby keeping the 
uneconomical projects in operation.113 Unless Congress also 
adds money to balance BPA’s books, however, enacting H.R. 
3144 will only make a bad economic situation worse—if 
Congress does enact the bill, it would amount to federal 
taxpayers subsidizing the maintenance of uneconomical 
projects that damage listed endangered species. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The struggle over the LSR dams has been a long one—and it 
is far from over.  It took eighteen years to obtain a court-
ordered, biologically-justified spill level, and within a week of 
the Ninth Circuit’s decision upholding that decision, the U.S. 
House of Representatives took action to override it.114 That 
                                                 
108. Brink of Extinction, supra note 6, at 1 (quoting Elliott Mainzer, BPA 
Administrator, Mar. 14, 2018). 
109. Brink of Extinction, supra note 6, at 2 (observing that beginning in 2008 BPA 
began draining what was a $917 million reserve account to around $5 million in 2018). 
110. Brink of Extinction, supra note 6, at 4 (suggesting that BPA’s strategy “fails to 
meet the test of a sound business model”). 
111. Jones & Laughy, supra note 91, at 2 (noting that over 50% of the LSR dams is 
produced during the spring runoff, when prices are lowest). 
112. See supra § II. 
113. See Brink of Extinction, supra note 6, at 1 (citing BPA’s 2018–2023 Strategic 
Plan). 
114. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
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action may epitomize the divide between politics and science in 
the Pacific salmon wars because the bill passed the House with 
virtually no scientific support for reducing spill. Even if the bill 
is unlikely to pass the Senate, given Senator Murray’s 
opposition,115 its quick passage in the House reflects the 
current widespread hostility to science in Congress.116 
The future of the LSR dams remains cloudy. The fact that 
they are scientifically and economically unjustified does not 
mean that Congress, which approved them, however 
indirectly,117 must agree with the weight of scientific and 
economic opinion.  Dams that have been removed to date have 
all been non-federal dams, subject to additional regulatory 
requirements that federal dams are not.118 Except for the 
Elwah Dams, which were in or affected a national park,119 
Congress has yet to agree to remove a federal dam. 
Realistically, the unnecessary carnage inflicted on Snake 
River salmon by the LSR dams will continue until the 
congressional delegations of Oregon, Washington, and Idaho 
understand that the economics of maintaining the dams makes 
no sense for those they represent.120 Removal of the four LSR 
                                                 
115. See supra note 857 and accompanying text. 
116. There also seems to be a widespread opposition not only to science but also to 
law among rural Westerners, many of whom seem not to recognize clear federal 
authority to manage federal public lands.  See Michael C. Blumm & Olivier Jamin, The 
Property Clause and Its Discontents: Lessons From the Malheur Occupation, 43 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 781 (2017). 
117. See supra notes 9, 78 and accompanying text. 
118. In particular, non-federal dams have only limited license terms under the 
Federal Power Act and must be periodically relicensed, which prompts a 
reexamination of the project’s effects on the current environment.  Many relicensing 
proceedings have led to conditions that the licensee install fish passage facilities, 
which have many licensees to agree to remove their dams.  See generally Blumm & 
Erickson, supra note 12. 
119. See Blumm & Erickson, supra note 12, at 1049–58; Elwha River Ecosystem and 
Fisheries Restoration Act, S. 2527, 102d Cong. (1992). 
120. As congressionally authorized dams, the LSR dams will require congressional 
approval to remove them.  Congress rarely endorses measures like removal of the LSR 
dam removal which are opposed by local congressional delegations.  The fact that the 
congressional delegations of Idaho and Washington seem unlikely at present to 
support LSR dam removal does not mean that efforts to convince Congress of the 
economic wisdom of dam removal will be in vain.  Abolitionists never constituted a 
majority of the American antebellum public, yet slavery was abolished.  Same-sex 
marriage was also a minority perspective, and yet it is now constitutionally 
entrenched. 
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dams will open the door to a thriving salmon-based economy in 
the eastern Columbia Basin that will produce a more 
widespread and enduring economy than the existing—and 
declining—barge-centered economy that requires continuous 
federal subsidies to persist.121 It may be that widespread 
publicity of federal subsidies is necessary for the public to 
convince Congress to act. If so, salmon advocates need to 
become more vocal about the amount of federal money 




                                                 
121. Port of Lewiston Notches Third Straight Year of Financial Losses, IDAHO RIVERS 
UNITED (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.idahorivers.org/newsroom/2017/2/17/port-of-
lewiston (“Over the past 11 years the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers spent $33 million 
on Lower Granite sediment management planning and dredging the Snake and 
Clearwater confluence and two miles up the Clearwater River. With no indication 
container shipping will ever return to Lewiston, an estimated 80 percent of this $33 
million principally benefits a single private corporation that ships grain from its own 
property over its own docks. Not included here is the $10-$12 million that taxpayers 
spend each year to operate the locks through which this grain passes or the many 
more millions spent on frequent major rehabilitation of the locks and navigation 
channel.”) 
122. The federal subsidies amount to at least $13-15 million annually, according to 
the figures cited supra note 121. 
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